INTRODUCTION
On July 16, 1945, Project Manhattan's Trinity Test started a new era for humankind: the nuclear age. Months later, after the world experienced for the first time the horrors of a nuclear bomb being thrown on a city, international concern sparked quickly around the fact that the most lethal weapons ever created by human beings were enjoying a total lack of inspection and control. In this context, many actors started to speak up and elaborate systems to enable humans and nukes to coexist (and, hopefully, never to interact again). In 1946, some of the most notorious scientists of the 20th century released One World or None [1], a collection of essays that, among other considerations, suggested the creation of international mechanisms of supervision that, even in the eyes of its proposers, were seen as “impossible to state”.
It might sound contradictory that in the immediate post-war, a time where the credibility of agencies such as the United Nations was being tested and the scepticism among countries was growing, the discussions on nuclear weapon control mainly surrounded solutions that celebrated multilateralism and worldwide-scope guidelines. In my opinion, it is. And it is in light of such contradictions that I decided to explore alternatives to international systems of nuclear weapon control, particularly solutions that were engineered to work on a local sphere.
In this piece, I will defend bilateralism as a legitimate alternative to multilateral approaches in nuclear weapon non-proliferation and abolition by analyzing the Brazilian history of atomic energy control from the 1960s until today. By understanding how the country overcame adversities with its (historically) most controversial neighbor and elaborated a fruitful partnership after it, I believe we can learn a lot about how to better regulate nuclear weapons while respecting the national interests and sovereignty of a country, particularly the ones that claim to be marginalized by the international order in contemporaneity.
DEFINITIONS
Before we start, it is important for us to clarify some important terminology. In a few words, the expression “nuclear policy” refers to the set of guidelines and decisions related to the use, development, and regulation of nuclear energy and weapons. Within nuclear policy, there are many subfields. This text focuses primarily on non-proliferation and abolition, which respectively refer to the measures ensuring more countries don’t have nuclear weapons and the measures ensuring nuclear weapons cease to exist.
We should also define some terms regarding the dynamics between each country. “Bilateralism” can be comprehended as the type of political, economic, or cultural relations that happens between two sovereign/independent states (SAINT VINCENT AND THE GRENADINES [2]). Opposed to multilateralism, through bilateral relationships countries can develop tailored agreements that only apply to contracting states.
BACKGROUND
With that being said, let’s talk about History. On February 14th, 1967, the Treaty of Tlatelolco established the first nuclear weapon free zone in the world, which encompassed all the countries in Latin America. Besides guaranteeing a Nobel Peace Prize to Alfonso García Robles, then Mexican Minister of Foreign Affairs, it also served as a model for the creation of other nuclear weapon free zones around the world (NATIONAL GEOGRAPHIC)[3]. However, some nations refused to implement the Treaty at first. That was the case for both Brazil and Argentina, two countries that though present in the negotiations of the document would only put it in practice in 1994 (OPANAL)[4].
In the 1970s, Brazil and Argentina were regarded as a hotspot for nuclear proliferation risk. After all, both countries had, and still have, significant nuclear programs, and, in that time, were historically perceived as military rivals (MARZO)[5]. Talking about Brazil, the country was signatory of the safeguards models INFCIRC 66 and INFCIRC 110, and INFCIRC 237 (IAEA)[6]. These texts established guidelines for a non-military nuclear program and the transfer of materials and technology between Brazil and the USA and Brazil and Germany, legitimizing the creation of the Angra Nuclear Power Plant (Angras 1 and 2) and the Resende Nuclear Fuel Factory. Throughout the decade, both Brazil and Argentina kept developing their domestic nuclear programs, with the former focusing on Uranium enrichment by centrifugation and the latter by gaseous diffusion, but such movements raised international concern regarding the real intentions behind such progress - were there military plans underneath?
In the early 1980s, Brazil’s ambitious goal of building the Itaipu Dam led to political tensions with Argentina. However, since those were successfully sought through diplomatic means, channels of dialogue were opened even in the midst of two decadent military dictatorships. At first, cooperation in the nuclear technology field was limited to the industrial and commercial spheres, but both countries were also informally communicating with each other about progress in the Scientific realm. In fact, the 1980s were a critical time for approximation between Brazil and Argentina. Besides what was mentioned, we can also cite two other events that put the countries in the mood for collaboration: from a political perspective, the 1982 Falklands War (Brazil was one of the few nations that stood by Argentina in the conflict)[7], and from a scientific perspective, the 1987 Goiânia accident (technical contributions from Argentina helped resolve the radioactive contamination issue) (MARZO).
In 1985, Brazil created the Brazil-Argentina Permanent Committee on Nuclear Policy (CPPN), an institution that encompassed professionals from diplomatic, academic, technical, and industrial backgrounds. In this context, formal cooperation in nuclear matters and bilateral agreements compromising with peaceful use were discussed for the first time. In the 1987 CPPN meeting, Argentina demonstrated interest in mutual cooperation and control agreements, but Brazil initially preferred sharing solely technical-scientific efforts to reduce internal and external pressures. However, as both countries underwent a democratic transition after years of military dictatorships, both presidents Alfonsín and Sarney were very enthusiastic about the non-proliferation cause. The Brazilian and Argentinian nuclear programs then enter an era of great transparency, as presidents visit critical locations, exchange information about each other’s research and industrial facilities, and place nuclear programs under civilian control.
1987 was the year in which both nuclear programs became officially transparent, and with that many confidence-building measures started to take place. Sarney himself visits a gaseous diffusion facility, and working groups are established in nuclear safeguards and security (MARZO). In 1988, the first Latin American Safeguards Course (SSAC) was held, sponsored by the IAEA and witnessing the participation of many countries, including Cuba and Venezuela (MARZO). However, despite its progress in transparency, Brazil still resisted the idea of doing mutual nuclear safety inspections with Argentina, defending that the main collaboration point between the two countries should happen in Science and Technology. However, at this point, real pressure was being exerted by the international community so Brazil would sign the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). For example, in the late 80s the country needed money to make repairs in the Angra 1 nuclear power plant, but the money would only be provided by the International Monetary Fund if the treaty was signed (MARZO).
Such pressure was decisive to define Fernando Collor’s approach to nuclear policy. After taking charge, Sarney’s successor quickly agrees to sign mutual control and cooperation treaties with Argentina. In 1990, the Foz do Iguaçu Declaration was signed, establishing the approval of the Common System for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials (SCCC). In 1991, the Guadalajara Agreement for the Exclusively Peaceful Use of Nuclear Energy (Bilateral Agreement) also established the creation of the Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials (ABACC), which aimed at the application and management of the SCCC. Lastly, in 1991, the Quadripartite Agreement was signed, in which Brazil, Argentina, the IAEA, and ABACC consolidate the system for application of safeguards that is currently in force in both countries (ABACC)[8].
It is interesting to note that Brazil and Argentina only signed the NPT after all these measures were already in place (BAN MONITOR)[9], meaning the decision to adhere to the treaty was much more of a political move rather than a necessity from a technical point of view. In fact, ABACC itself was accepted as the mandatory NPT’s safeguards treaty in the case of Brazil (MARZO), illustrating there are no practical limitations for the country to adhere to any international nuclear safeguards.
WHY IS ABACC DIFFERENT?
As mentioned before, its mission is to guarantee that all the existing nuclear materials and facilities between Brazil and Argentina are being used for exclusively peaceful purposes by administering and applying a full-scope treaty: the SCCC (ABACC). In ABACC, the inspectors are appointed by the countries involved, but what guarantees the good functioning of the system is its status as an independent institution with international recognition.
We can say the existence of ABACC is a clear demonstration of the political willingness of the two developing countries to provide transparency in their nuclear programs, fostering mutual trust, and contributing to an increase in regional and international security (ABACC). What is so good about ABACC is that, as an institution, it simultaneously respected the national sovereignty of Brazil and Argentina, promoted Scientific cooperation between them (a great example of this is the ABACC-Cristallini Method for the collection of samples of Uranium hexafluoride, use to analyze the percentage of enrichment of the material) (ESG)[10], and established an autonomous but trustworthy safeguards system.
TAKEAWAYS
Why is it important to discuss the ABACC case in the context of international nuclear policy? We can start by saying that ABACC is, currently, the only bilateral nuclear security institution of its kind in the world. Of the same kind, we can also mention the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom), both multilateral organisms (MARZO). This implies bilateralism is somewhat of a counterintuitive approach to nuclear policy, but ABACC shows us that, when done correctly, this method has a lot of positive impact.
One of the main concerns of developing nations when it comes to constraining their nuclear programs by adhering to treaties and conventions is how this can negatively impact or slow down advances in Science and Technology (ESG). ABACC shows itself as a real counterexample: even though it serves as a nuclear safety and safeguards institution, it was born, primarily, from Scientific collaboration between Argentina and Brazil (MARZO), and such partnership was intense to the point of producing technology that can revolutionize the way Uranium enrichment analysis are conducted worldwide. Think about all the potential for positive cooperation being wasted by the international community’s intense preference for multilateralism, which oftentimes means non-nuclearized nations compromising to stay non-nuclearized and nuclearized countries not adhering to any resolutions.
Some critics might point out that the timing is off: solutions such as ABACC had a specific period in History to be implemented. However, it’s also possible to point out that during COP 28, which happened a little more than a year ago, 22 countries signed the Net-Zero Nuclear Initiative (and many endorsed it later), which aims to triple the electric energy produced through nuclear sources by 2050 (DOE)[11]. Thinking about how little international mechanisms we have to monitor and regulate such growth, ensuring it will be restricted to civilian uses, it is more important than ever to discuss alternative mechanisms of nuclear safety, and this notably includes talking about bilateral agencies in the model of ABACC.
Lastly, I claim the ABACC bilateral model is even more concrete and realistic than other nuclear policy alternatives trending in recent years, such as the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons. ABACC was born out of the active initiative of two countries and took into account, since the beginning, real concerns regarding regional policy, Scientific progress, and national sovereignty. Relying solely on moral principles and in the “the nuclear taboo” (GUSTERSON)[12] is a very indirect approach to a very concrete problem, and in this context the point of defending the creation of more bilateral nuclear safety agencies prevails.
To make it clear, I don’t believe bilateralism is a solution to all concerns regarding nuclear policy. As discussed with Marzo, there are key scientific and political similarities countries must present in order for a solution like that to work, such as certain symmetry between the goals of their nuclear programs and a level of political similarity (in the case of ABACC, both Brazil and Argentina overcame differences because of a shared disapproval from the international community). I also believe this solution would work much better in countries that don’t yet have nuclear weapons (or at least nuclear weapons that are known of). However, core characteristics of ABACC such as countries pointing out their own inspectors and independence from the larger international community really reinforce its uniqueness, and should be seen (and more often discussed) as a valid solution for the topics of non-proliferation and, to some extent, abolition.
My goals with this text also included increasing the number of materials available in English about ABACC, since most of the bibliography on the agency is currently in Portuguese, making it harder for such a noteworthy institution to be widely known and used as a reference in nuclear safety discussions around the globe. Let this be the beginning of a new era in nuclear policy, in which countries feel more confident and eager to adhere to safeguards that make the world a safer place for everyone!
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean. Status of the Treaty of Tlatelolco. Available in <https://opanal.org/en/status-of-the-treaty-of-tlatelolco/>. Accessed Nov 28, 2024.
Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean. Resolution 271. Available in <https://www.opanal.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/CG12res271i.pdf>. Accessed Dec 4, 2024.
Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials. History. Available in <https://www.abacc.org.br/en/the-abacc/history>. Accessed Dec 2, 2024.
Brazilian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Brazil supports Argentina's rights in the sovereignty dispute with the United Kingdom over the Falkland, South Georgia and South Sandwich Islands. Available in <https://www.gov.br/mre/en/contact-us/press-area/press-releases/brazils-support-for-argentinas-rights-in-the-sovereignty-dispute-with-the-united-kingdom-over-the-falkland-south-georgia-and-south-sandwich-islands>. Accessed Dec 3, 2024.
Brazilian Superior War College. O Brasil e o Regime de Não Proliferação Nuclear. Available in <https://www.gov.br/esg/pt-br/centrais-de-conteudo/publicacoes/livretos/arquivos/o_brasil_e_o_regime_de_nao_proliferacao_nuclear.pdf>. Accessed Nov 20, 2024.
Hugh Gusterson. Nuclear Weapons and the Other in Western Imagination, 1999.
International Atomic Energy Agency. INFCIRC/66. Available in <https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/publications/documents/infcircs/1965/infcirc66r2.pdf>. Accessed Nov 28, 2024.
International Atomic Energy Agency. INFCIRC/110. Available in <https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/infcirc110_0.pdf>. Accessed Nov 28, 2024.
International Atomic Energy Agency. INFCIRC/237. Available in <https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/infcirc237.pdf>. Accessed Nov 28, 2024.
Marco Marzo and Maria Cristina Lourenço, representing the Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials. Interview conducted by Maria Eduarda Rodrigues Sampaio via Zoom on November 28th, 2024.
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Foreign Trade and Consumer Affairs of St Vincent and the Grenadines. Bilateral Relations. Available in: <https://foreign.gov.vc/foreign/index.php/bilateral-relations#:~:text=Bilateral%20Relations%20(Bilateralism)%20consists%20of,relations%20with%20approximately%20135%20countries.>. Accessed Dec 2, 2024.
National Geographic Brazil. Você sabia que a América Latina possui um acordo sobre armas nucleares? Conheça o Tratado de Tlatelolco. Available in: <https://www.nationalgeographicbrasil.com/historia/2024/09/voce-sabia-que-a-america-latina-possui-um-acordo-sobre-armas-nucleares-conheca-o-tratado-de-tlatelolco>. Accessed Nov 28, 2024.
Nuclear Weapons Ban Monitor. State profiles. Available in <https://banmonitor.org/profiles>. Accessed Dec 3, 2024.
Et. al. One World or None, 1947.
U.S. Department of Energy. At COP28, Countries Launch Declaration to Triple Nuclear Energy Capacity by 2050, Recognizing the Key Role of Nuclear Energy in Reaching Net Zero. Available in <https://www.energy.gov/articles/cop28-countries-launch-declaration-triple-nuclear-energy-capacity-2050-recognizing-key>. Accessed Dec 3, 2024.
